Box Midfield and Homologation
Executive and causal differences in the box midfield of Manchester City, Arsenal and Barcelona
The tactical evolution of football lives of historical cycles, of dialectical moments in which the new becomes old and the old becomes new. In his Histories, Herodotus described the cyclical evolution of political regimes (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, and then onwards to infinity) with the term anacyclosis. It is a concept in some way applicable to football, in which we continually draw from the past to shape and adapt it to modern philosophies, systems, and rhythms. As Emiliano Battazzi writes in his Calcio Liquido:
Although constantly evolving, football has never followed a straight line, but rather often reworks the past, as evidenced by the several tactical references.
In this sense, football has always sought aemulatio (imitation and improvement) as opposed to imitatio (a slavish copy) from the Latin era.
In this precise period of history, a playing form introduced in the 1930s in English football called WM for the shape the team takes with this arrangement is rediscovering a new youth. Using numbers, we could describe it as a 3-2-2-3. During the 2022/23 season, WM has been the shape of reference for teams that have achieved great results, such as Arteta's Arsenal, who have been one of the most exciting teams in Europe for large parts of the season, Xavi's Barcelona, winners of La Liga, or Guardiola's Manchester City, who won the legendary Treble. Nowadays, especially among Anglo-Saxon pundits, it is customary to identify a specific aspect of this module as the real core of the structure, namely the presence of four midfielders arranged in a shape resembling a square or a box, hence the name box midfield.
It is said that we have reached the twilight of the positional play that has dominated the last 15 years of European football, in favor of a way of seeing football that focuses on the individual player and relationships with teammates rather than the pursuit of space. Nevertheless, the 2022/23 European season seems to suggest that we are still living in the era of Positionism, as the results of the aforementioned teams demonstrate. So, why are so many prominent coaches trying this solution out?
The preachers of the positional game claim that the goal of this philosophy is to create superiority (numerical, positional, or socio-affective) all along the field in search of an optimal occupation of space (characterized by the geometric placement of players in the five offensive corridors) that facilitates the control of the ball and prepares the team with a functional structure for the immediate recovery of the ball in case of loss of possession.
The box midfield is particularly suited to the achievement of these objectives: the spacing is optimal, the narrow lines facilitate passing and are preparatory to the immediate recovery of the ball, the two players giving width help to find the room to attack in the half-space by widening the opponent's defensive lines or to create many one-on-ones, the build-up involving five players (six if we add the goalkeeper) forces opponents to defend in numerical inferiority or to go man on man risking the five-on-five at the back.
It is important to emphasize that this is not a rigid structure suitable for every phase of the game, but rather the outcome of a fluid collective movement that allows the team to transform in the transition from the out-of-possession phase to the possession phase or vice versa. The discussion becomes more interesting if we consider that each of the teams mentioned above develops this 3-2-2-3 in a unique way to meet different needs based on the characteristics of the players.
Barcelona can boast a very dense and qualitative midfield department thanks to players of the caliber of Busquets, de Jong, Gavi, and Pedri. The goal Xavi set himself after some initial difficulties were to find a way to make these four players coexist without necessarily having to give up one of them from the first minute. In the home match on 10 October, won 4-0 against Athletic Club, the Catalan coach re-proposed the traditional 4-3-3 with one small but significant difference: Pedri played as a left winger. In the possession phase, however, the 21-year-old narrowed his position by playing in the left half-space and leaving the width to Baldé (a full-back with a great offensive propensity and considerable technical and athletic qualities), while Gavi occupied the right half-space and de Jong dropped into the build-up alongside Busquets. During the season Xavi then preferred to reverse the positions of his two young talents, but in general, this tactical solution was one of the main keys to Barcelona's success because it allowed the Catalan coach to field all the best players at his disposal from the first minute.
In Arsenal's case, however, the purchase of Zinchenko from Manchester City played a key role. Under Guardiola's aegis, the Ukrainian underwent a mutation from quality offensive midfielder to left-back with a fluid interpretation of the role in which he started wide and then narrowed in on Rodri's side in the midfield during possession. Arteta replicated this typical Manchester City solution by asking Zinchenko to stand alongside Partey in the build-up, to move Xhaka and Odegaard higher into the half-space, while the forwards Martinelli and Saka occupied the width. Thanks to this structure Arteta was able to make the most of the characteristics of his players with the most potential and to recover players whose best years seemed to be behind them (Xhaka), thus establishing itself as one of the most effective teams in various phases of the game, from the build-up to counter-pressing. It should not be forgotten that until Saliba's injury in March (a player who was fundamental to the team's balance and the very high level he guaranteed in the first build-up) Arsenal had collected 66 points in 27 league games, putting them behind a crushing team like Manchester City, when at the beginning of the year the most optimistic expectations saw the Gunners fighting for fourth place.
It is no coincidence that Guardiola was a mentor to Xavi and Arteta. The former Barcelona and Bayern Munich coach has also proposed the 3-2-2-3 this season as a means of achieving that obsessive search for control which was never before so focused on defensive solidity, as exemplified by the constant deployment of four central defenders from the first minute to balance Erling Haaland's extreme verticality. The key man allowing Guardiola to change the face of his team is undoubtedly John Stones. This season, Man City have proposed two different movements to achieve the desired structure: the first one repeats the one seen with Arsenal, with Stones squeezing in from the right-back position to Rodri's side, allowing De Bruyne and Gundogan to get up in the half spaces; the second one consists of Stones moving up from the center-back position to play alongside Rodri, squeezing in the two full-backs Aké and Akanji on either side of Ruben Dias to form the 3+2.
Again, to reiterate that often in football nothing is invented, but we simply take concepts from the past and rework them in modern contexts, this is a solution that reminds us of Cruijff's Barcelona (which had Pep Guardiola at the center of everything, literally and metaphorically) with Miguel Angel Nadal - yes, Rafa's uncle - who would start the action as a center-back to then move up to exploit his athletic abilities and great timing for attacking the box.
Although they eventually reach the same structure, the causes and processes that lead Barcelona, Arsenal and Manchester City to propose this type of solution are extremely different. There is often talk of tactical homologation, i.e., the fact that more and more teams play similarly, making football increasingly aseptic. It is a position with various arguments in its favor, but one that runs the risk of flattening outcome and development. Guardiola, Arteta and Xavi show that even playing with the same module (to put it in poor words) their teams can be profoundly different because the fundamental and non-negligible element of the game is the individual footballer with his merits and flaws. Arteta's goal was to put the outstanding elements of his squad in the best possible condition; Xavi's goal was to find a solution to the crowdedness of his midfield; Guardiola's goal was to give balance to a team that seemed to have lost it at the start of the season.
Even considering the tactical consequences of this 3-2-2-3 the developments of the game can be quite different based on the characteristics of the players. Barcelona attack in a very different way compared to Arsenal and City, carrying the ball mainly on the left side where they can make a lot of density also thanks to Lewandowski's tendencies that lead him very often to move towards the center-left of the field, to then reverse the front and find Dembélé isolated on the weak side where he can be lethal and has the skills to put Lewandowski (the team's main scorer with 22 goals, the second, Raphinha, is far behind with 7) in a position to score inside the area.
Arsenal, on the other hand, were looking more for control of the pitch centrally to allow Odegaard, the team's offensive beacon, to receive between the defense and midfield lines and to touch many balls in dangerous areas. Once they reach the final third of the pitch, the Gunners are a team with a strong emphasis on collectivity: no less than three players have reached 20 goal contributions (Saka 24, Odegaard 22, Martinelli 20), almost four if we consider that Gabriel Jesus has scored 10 goals and five assists despite having missed almost half of the season.
For Manchester City, the desire to put one specific player in a position to score is even more evident than in Barcelona, but this is also noticeable in the development of actions and not only in the crude difference between the goals scored by Haaland and those scored by his teammates. From the very first build-up, Guardiola's team tried to loosen the markings of the opponents terrorized by Haaland, for example by asking De Bruyne and Gundogan to play initially behind the midfielders and then spread out and provide a line of passing to the center-backs, forcing the rival team to a tough choice: allow them to receive freely and accept in the long run total domination of the pitch and the ball, or follow them (for example by bringing out one of the center-backs) with the risk of leaving space for Haaland or one of the two wingers players to attack?
Ancelotti in the Champions semi-finals opted for the first strategy by keeping Alaba and Militao very tight to keep the Norwegian at bay. The result? 4-0.
Apart from the three under consideration, an increased number of teams seem to want to line up with the 3-2-2-3. To give another example, even Jurgen Klopp lately has asked Trent Alexander-Arnold to play narrow in the build-up phase on Fabinho's side, raising the midfielders and keeping the forwards wide following Arsenal's style with Zinchenko. Since I am Italian I cannot but mention Mancini's national team that won the European Championship two summers ago that also played similarly by dropping Verratti in the build-up and moving Insigne inside in the half-space, leaving the width to Spinazzola, just as Barcelona does with Gavi and Baldé. It is difficult to predict how many coaches will join this new trend in European football and what further developments it may have, but it is fundamental to understand that it is not a question of one formation being better than others (there are no formations that are better than others a priori), because the technical, physical and mental characteristics of the players are always the starting point and never the point of arrival. Guardiola, Arteta and Xavi also profess a similar philosophy due to a comparable background, but they arrived at the same layout with different means and to respond to different needs, moreover, developing their football in a further unique way despite starting from the same formation.
In Hegelian concepts we could say that we are in the first stage of dialectical development (thesis). It only remains to be seen then who will be able to find effective countermeasures against this way of playing (antithesis) and what will be the final product of this clash (synthesis).
More on this:
Tifo’s video:
Michael Booroff’s article:
L’Ultimo Uomo’s (Lobanovski) podcast:
Brilliant as ever. Thanks, Marco.